The strategy of technology was clearly enunciated in a book of the same name by Stephan Poissony and Jerry Pournelle. The book was required reading in the U.S. service academies during the latter half of the Cold War. It is available on the net at [1], free, with a suggested contribution.

The basic doctrine is for a technically-advanced country to use its asymmetric advantage in technology to create and deploy weapons of sufficient power and numbers so as to overawe or beggar its opponents.

The classic example of the successful deployment of this strategy was the nuclear build-up between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the Cold War.

Some observers believe that the Vietnam War was a necessary attritive component to this war (Soviet industrial capacity was diverted to conventional arms in N. Vietnam, rather than development of new weapons and nuclear weapons).

The coup-de-grace is considered to have been Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, a clear attempt to obsolesce the Soviet nuclear arsenal, creating an immense expense for the Soviets to maintain parity.

Those who argue the stratergy was not a great success in the Cold War argue that the Soviet Union did little to try to keep up with the SDI system, and that the War in Afghanistan caused a far greater drain on Soviet resources.