Representationalism, or the representational theory of perception, is a philosophical doctrine that in any act of perception, the immediate (direct) object of perception is a sense-datum that represents an external object, which is the mediate (indirect) object of perception.
Two 17th century philosophers, René Descartes, and John Locke most prominently advocated this theory. The term they used was not "sense-datum" but "idea." This article does not discuss any differences in meaning that these terms might have. "Idea" as used in the theory of perception is a technical term, meaning roughly the same thing as sense-datum. Representationalism is one of the key assumptions of cognitivism in psychology.
Representationalism asserts that sense-data represent external objects -- physical objects, properties, and events. But this immediately raises a question: How well do sense-data represent external objects, properties, and events? At least sometimes, they do not represent them at all well. It is often the case that our perceptions do not correlate at all well with physical reality and this aspect of representationalism has led to psychologists questioning such things as police identity parades.
Representationalism also has the advantage that it allows dreams and imaginings to be considered on the same basis as perceptions, perhaps, as recent fMRI studies have shown, using similar areas of the brain.
An apparent problem with representationalism is that it seems to assume that something in the brain, a homunculus is viewing the content of the brain. This suggests that some physical effect or phenomenon other than simple data flow and information processing must be involved in perception.
The failure of information processing theory to explain representationalism has led many psychologists to reject it in favour of other approaches. This rejection of representationalism has been encouraged by a widespread misunderstanding of the homunculus argument. The need for a homunculus in a theory of mind shows that the theory is either incomplete or invalid, in the case of representationalism the theory is clearly incomplete, not invalid.
See also
Last updated: 05-03-2005 17:50:55
