Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 was a critical turning point in the Napoleonic wars, proving disastrous for France and its allies. Napoleon called it the Second Polish War, while it has been known in Russia as the Patriotic War (Russian: Отечественная война, Otechestvennaya Voyna). Since the times of World War II it has been referred to in Russian literature as Patriotic War of 1812, to distinguish from the Great Patriotic War, which refers to the Nazi-Soviet war during the WWII. In Russian, it is also occasionally referred to as the War of 1812, though in English that name is reserved for the British-American War.
The Invasion
In June 1812, Napoleon's Grande Armée of 610,000 men, the largest army assembled up to that point in European history, crossed the river Neman and headed towards Moscow. The initially 280,000-strong Russian army sought to avoid open battle, and turned to attrition warfare; under the scorched earth policy, Russian troops retreating before the French advance would burn crops and villages, thereby denying the enemy their use. The Russians also harassed the French flanks with attacks from small battalions of Russian troops and local Cossacks. Though the Russian army suffered defeats on the approaches to Moscow in the battles of Smolensk (August 4–6) and Borodino (August 26), it was not decisively destroyed, and inflicted almost as many casualties as it suffered. By the end of August, Napoleon had lost two-thirds of his army but kept marching on towards Moscow. On September 1, Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, in command of the Russian Army since early August, ordered the evacuation of the city.
By this point the Russians had managed to draft large numbers of reinforcements into the army bringing total Russian land forces to a strength of around 904,000 with perhaps 100,000 in the immediate viccinity of Moscow - the remnants of Kutuzov's shattered army from Borodino partially reinforced. The ability of the Russians to so quickly replenish their numbers was the critical advanatge that would bring them ultimate victory by the end of the campaign.
The Capture of Moscow
Napoleon moved into an empty city that was stripped of all supplies. Relying on classical rules of warfare aiming at capturing the enemy's capital (even though St. Petersburg had been the capital since the early 18th century, not Moscow), he had expected tsar Alexander I to offer his capitulation, but Russian command did not surrender. Instead, fires broke out in Moscow, and raged in the city from 2 to 6 September. Moscow, constructed mainly of wooden buildings, burnt down almost completely, effectively depriving the French of shelter in the city. It is assumed that the fires were due to Russian sabotage, in line with scorched earth tactics.
Retreat
Sitting in the ashes of a ruined city without having received the Russian capitulation, and facing a Russian maneuver forcing him out of Moscow, Napoleon started his long retreat. At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov was able to force the French army into using the very same scorched Smolensk road on which they had earlier moved East; continuing to block the southern flank to prevent the French from returning by a different route, Kutuzov again deployed partisan tactics to constantly strike at the French trail where it was weakest. Light Russian cavalry, including mounted Cossacks, assaulted and shattered isolated French units. Supply of the army grew increasingly difficult, and the desertion rate increased. Starting in November 1812, the Russian winter caused additional hardship to the French army, as soldiers and horses started to die from hunger, frostbite and exhaustion on the march. The crossing of the river Berezina brought about another major defeat, as Kutuzov, deciding that the time was right for an open battle, attacked and crushed the part of the French army that had not yet made it across the bridge. In the following weeks, the remnants of the Grand Army were further diminished, and on December 14 1812 they were expelled from Russian territory. Only about 10,000 of Napoleon's men survived the Russian campaign. Russian casualties in the few open battles are comparable to the French losses, but civilian losses along the devastated war path were much higher than the military casualties. In total, despite earlier estimates giving figures of several million dead, around one million were killed - fairly evenly split between the French and Russians. Military losses amounted to 300,000 French, 70,000 Poles, 50,000 Italians, 80,000 Germans and perhaps 450,000 Russians.
Historical Assessment
The Russian victory over the French army in 1812 marked the first blow to Napoleon's ambitions of European dominance, and was the turning-point of the Napoleonic Wars that led to Napoleon's ultimate defeat. For Russia the term Patriotic War (an English rendition of the Russian "Отечественная война", better translated as War of the Fatherland) formed a symbol for a strengthened national identity that would have a great impact on Russian patriotism in the 19th century. The indirect result of the patriotic movement of Russians was a strong desire for the modernisation of the country that would result in a series of revolutions, starting from the Decembrist revolt and ending with the February Revolution of 1917.
Comparison with the Great Patriotic War
The Soviet government meant to evoke patriotic feelings related to the Patriotic War when it proclaimed the struggle against Hitler's invasion in 1941 the "Great Patriotic War". Indeed, the parallels between the German invasion and the French campaign are striking. Both attacked in mid-June (Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on the day before the anniversary of Napoleon's invasion), advancing towards Moscow as the major Russian city. Both fought bitter battles on the road to Moscow at Smolensk. As they marched deeper into Russian territory, both faced scorched soil ahead, and partisans in the rear. Neither Hitler nor Napoleon had anticipated a prolongation of their campaign, so neither had equipped his armies for winter warfare. Most crucially, both Hitler and Napoleon had underestimated two things - Russian tenacity and determination in defence of their motherland and the sheer vastness of Russia.
In spite of these parallels, the type of warfare waged by Hitler and Napoleon differed considerably. The Nazis studied the main causes of Napoleon's failures thoroughly when planning the Soviet invasion. Napoleon mounted a classical campaign of the time, marching in a single trek towards the enemy's major city (note that Moscow was not the Russian capital at the time, Saint Petersburg was). In small, rich European countries, such tactics allowed the French army to acquire food, boots and uniforms, weapons, ammunition and horses in conquered territories themselves; supply lines to the rear were of smaller importance. In vast and poor Russia, these tactics proved fatal. Hitler, on the other hand, unleashed a modern 20th century war including quick, relentless offensives with armoured vehicles.
Having six times as much manpower at his disposal as Napoleon, and pursuing different strategic objectives, Hitler relied on broad territorial control, hence the broad offensive from the Baltic states to the Ukraine. Supply lines to the domestic industrial areas in the rear became crucial, especially in a war against the Soviet Union which would not succeed within weeks, like earlier Blitzkrieg campaigns in the West had. Once the blitzkrieg ended, the Germans chose to fight it out in every region they controlled rather than retreat, leading to terrible losses amongst both Germans and Russians as they fought over occupied territory. Furthermore, Napoleon did little to stop partisan attacks on his flanks, thus enabling partisans to engage in hit-and run tactics with impunity. Hitler and the Nazis, on the other hand, marched in with fully equipped secret police agents to hunt down and kill partisans in the rear of the broad territories they controlled, making resistance a lot more difficult although it was still effective.
List of Russian commanders
References
1812: Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow, Adam Zamoyski, HarperCollins, 644 Pages. ISBN 0027123752
Last updated: 05-16-2005 20:40:16
