Search

The Online Encyclopedia and Dictionary

 
     
 

Encyclopedia

Dictionary

Quotes

   
 

Battle of Warsaw (1920)

Battle of Warsaw
Battle of Warsaw. Painting by Wojciech Kossak.
Battle of Warsaw
Conflict Polish-Bolshevik War
Date 13 to August 25, 1920
Place near Warsaw, Poland
Result Decisive Polish victory
Combatants
Poland Bolshevist Russia
Commanders
Józef Piłsudski,
Tadeusz Rozwadowski , Władysław Sikorski
Mikhail Tukhachevski, Joseph Stalin,
Semyon Budyonny
Strength
113,000 troops 114,000 troops
Casualties
4,500 KIA,
22,000 WIA,
10,000 MIA
20,000 KIA,
66,000 POW,
30,000 interned in East Prussia


The Battle of Warsaw (sometimes referred to as the Miracle at the Vistula, Polish Cud nad Wisła) was the decisive battle of the Polish-Bolshevik War (also known as the Polish-Soviet War) that took place soon after the end of World War I in 1918.

Battle of Warsaw was fought between 13 and 25 August, 1920, as Red Army forces commanded by Mikhail Tukhachevski approached Polish capital of Warsaw and the nearby Modlin Fortress. On August 16 Polish forces commanded by Józef Piłsudski counter-attacked from the south, forcing the Russian forces into a disorganised withdrawal east, behind the Niemen River. Estimated Bolsheviks losses were 20,000 killed and 66,000 taken prisoner, compared to Polish losses of approximately 4,500 killed.

Before the Miracle at the Vistula, both the Bolsheviks and majority of foreign experts considered Poland to be on the verge of defeat. The Polish stunning and unexpected victory in the Battle of Warsaw crippled the Bolshevik forces. Over the coming months, several more Polish victories destroyed Lenin's hopes of spreading the communist revolution by force and lending Red Army's help to the German Revolution.

Contents

Prelude to the battle

If Charles Martel had not checked the Saracen conquest at the Battle of Tours, the interpretation of the Koran would be taught at the schools of Oxford, and her pupils might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.
Had Pilsudski and Weygand failed to arrest the triumphant advance of the Soviet Army at the Battle of Warsaw, not only would Christianity have experienced a dangerous reverse, but the very existence of Western civilisation would have been imperilled. The Battle of Tours saved our ancestors from the Yoke of the Koran; it is probable that the Battle of Warsaw saved Central and parts of Western Europe from a more subversive danger – the fanatical tyranny of the Soviet.
On the essential point, there can be little room for doubt; had the Soviet forces overcome Polish resistance… Bolshevism would have spread throughout Central Europe and might well have penetrated the whole continent.’
-- Edgar Vincent D'Abernon 1

Poles were fighting to preserve their newly regained independence, lost in 1795 after partitions of Poland and carve out the borders of the new country from the territory of their former partitioners, Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary.

Bolsheviks have gained an upper hand in the Russian Civil War in 1919, dealing crippling blows to their opponents, the White Russians. Vladimir Lenin viewed Poland as the bridge that had to be crossed so that communist ideals could be brought to the Central and Western Europe, and the Polish-Bolshevik War seemed like a perfect way to test the Bolsheviks strength. Revolution was to be carried on the bayonets of the Soviet "soldats" to the Western Europe. The shortest route to Berlin and Paris led through Warsaw. After early setbacks against Poland in 1919, the Bolsheviks offensive that begun in early 1920 had been overwhelmingly successful and by mid-1920, the entire world expected Poland to collapse any moment. The Soviet strategy called for a massed push towards Polish capital, Warsaw. The capture of Warsaw would have a tremendous propaganda effect for the Soviets, who expected this not only to undermine the morale of the Poles but to start a series of worldwide communist uprisings, and clear the path for the Red Army to join German Revolution.


The Soviet 1st Cavalry Army under Semyon Budyonny broke through Polish lines in mid-June 1920. This led to collapse of all Polish fronts in the east. On July 4, 1920, Mikhail Tukhachevski's Western Front began an all-out assault in Belarus from the Berezina River, forcing Polish forces into retreat. On July 19 the Red Army seized Grodno, on July 28 reached Białystok, and three days later captured the Brześć fortress. The withdrawal of Polish forces from the north-eastern front was somewhat chaotic.

The battle plan

Polish plan

However, by the beginning of August the Polish retreat had become more organized. At first Pilsudski wanted to base his operation on the Bug River and Brest-Litovsk, but the unexpected fall of these two barriers made it impossible. On the night of August 5-August 6 Józef Piłsudski in Belvedere conceived a revised plan of action. This new plan called for Polish forces withdrawal across the Vistula River and defense of the bridgeheads at Warsaw and the Wieprz River. Some 25% of the available divisions would be concentrated to the south for a strategic counter-offensive.

Next, Piłsudzki's plan required that 1st and 2nd Army of the Gen. Józef Haller's Central Front (10 1/2 divisions) take passive role, facing the Soviet frontal attack on Warsaw from the east, keep their entrenched positions at any cost. At the same time the 5th Army (5 1/2 divisions) under Gen. Władysław Sikorski would strike north from behind Warsaw thus cutting off the Soviet forces attempting to envelope Warsaw from that direction, and break through the enemy front and fall on the rear of the Soviet North-Western Front. Additional 5 divisions in the 5th Army were defending Warsaw from the north. The most important role, however, was assigned to a relatively small (~20 000), newly assembled Reserve Army (known also as Assault Group - Grupa Uderzeniowa), commanded personally by Józef Piłsudski, composed of battle hardened and most determined Polish units. Their task was to spearhead a lightning northern offensive, from the Vistula-Wieprz river triangle south of Warsaw, through a weak spot identified by Polish intelligence between Soviet Western and South-Western Fronts. That offensive would separate the Western Front from its reserves and disorganize its movements. Eventually, the gap between Gen. Sikorski's 5th Army and the advancing Reserve Army would close near the East Prussian border, and result in the destruction of the "trapped in a sack" Soviet offensive.

Although based on fairly reliable information provided by Polish intelligence and intercepted Soviet radio communications, the plan was labelled as 'amateurish' by many high ranking army officers and military experts, who were quick to point out Piłsudski's lack of formal military education. Many Polish units one week before the planned date of the counter-attack were fighting in places as far as 100-150 miles from the concentration points. All movement of troops was done within striking distance of the Red Army. One strong push by them could derail plans for counter-attack and endanger cohesion of the whole Polish front. Piłsudski's plan was strongly criticized by Polish commanders and officers of the French Expeditionary Corps, and even Piłsudzki himself in his memoires admitted that this was a very risky gamble and the only reason he decided to go forward with the plan was the defeatist mood of politicians, fear for the safety of the capital and the prevailing feeling that if Warsaw was to fall, all was lost. Only desperate situation of Polish forces persuaded other army commanders to go along with it, as they realized that under circumstances it was the only possible solution to avoid the defeat. Coincidentally, when a copy of the plan fell accidentally into Soviet hands it was considered to be a poor deception attempt and ignored. Only days later the Soviets would pay dearly for that mistake.

Bolshevik plan

Mikhail Tukhachevski planned to encircle and surround Warsaw by crossing the Vistula river, near Włocławek, to the north and south of the city and launch an attack from the north-west. With his 24 divisions he planned to repeat the classic manouvre of Ivan Paskievich , who in 1831, during the November Uprising, had crossed the Vistula at Toruń and reached Warsaw practically unopposed. This move would also cut the Polish forces off from Gdańsk, the only port open to shipments of arms and supplies.

First phase, August 12

The final Soviet assault on Warsaw began on August 12 at the town of Radzymin (only 23 km east of Warsaw) and its initial success prompted Piłsudski to hasten the execution of his defence plan by 24 hours.


The first phase of the battle started August 13 with a Red Army frontal assault on the Praga bridgehead. In heavy fighting, Radzymin changed hands several times and foreign diplomats with the exception of British and Vatican ambassadors, hastily left Warsaw. On August 14 it fell to the Red Army, and the lines of Gen. Władysław Sikorski's Polish 5th Army were broken. The 5th Army had to fight three Soviet armies at once: the 3rd, 4th and 15th. The Modlin sector was reinforced with reserves (the Siberian Brigade, and Gen. Franciszek Krajowski 's fresh 18th Infantry Division--both, elite, battle-tested units), and the 5th Army held out till dawn.

Its situation was saved by the fact that by midnight the 203rd Uhlan Regiment managed to break through the Bolshevik lines and destroyed the radio station of Dimitriy Shuvayev 's Soviet 4th Army. The latter thus lost contact with its headquarters and continued marching toward Toruń and Płock, unaware of Tukhachevski's order to turn south. The raid by the 203rd Uhlans is sometimes referred to as the Miracle of Ciechanów.

At the same time, the Polish 1st Army under Gen. Franciszek Latinik resisted a Red Army direct assault on Warsaw by six rifle divisions. The struggle for control of Radzymin forced Gen. Józef Haller, commander of the Polish Northern Front, to start the 5th Army's counter-attack earlier than planned.

During that time, behind the front lines, Pilsudski was finishing his plans for the counter-offensive. Pilsudski decided to personally supervise the attack and because of the enormous risks involved, understanding the danger of combat, before departing for the front he handed a letter with his resignation from all state functions which he held. Next, between August 13 and 15, he visited all units of the 4th Army concentrating near Puławy, about 100km south of Warsaw. He tried to raise the morale of the units, since many soldiers were tired and demoralized and recently incorporated numerous replacements proved to everyone the extent of the losses endured during the recent retreats. Logistics were a nightmare, Polish army was supported by guns made in five countries and used rifles manufactured in six different countries, each of them used different ammunition. Equipment was in poor shape. Pilsudski remembers: "In 21 Division almost half of the soldiers paraded in front of me bare-feet." Nevertheless in only three days Pilsudski was able to rise the morale of his troops and motivate them for the greatest efforts. Within a short time troops spirit changed from morale breakdown to full confidence in absolute victory.

Second phase, August 14

The 27th Infantry Division of the Red Army managed to get to the village of Izabelin 8 miles from the capital of Poland but it was the closest Russian forces would come to Warsaw. Soon the tides of the victory would change.


Tukhachevski, certain that all was going according to his plan, was actually falling into Piłsudzki's trap. Russian march across Vistula in the north was striking in the operational vacuum as there was no sizeable Polish troops in that area. On the other hand, south from Warsaw, where the fate of the war was about to be decided, Tukhachevski left only token forces to guard vital link between North-Western and South-Western Fronts. Mozyr Group, which was to fulfil this task, numbered only 8 thousand soldiers. Another error committed by the Soviet generals, which influenced the outcome of the war, neutralized 1st Cavalry Army of Budionnyi, much feared by Piłsudzki and other Polish commanders. Soviet High Command, at Tukhachevski's insistence, ordered the 1st Cavalry Army to march toward Warsaw from the south. Budionnyi did not obey this order due to grudge between commanding South-Western Front generals Aleksandr Yegorov and Tukhachevski. In addition, the political games of Joseph Stalin who was at a time chief political commissar of the South-Western Front, decisively influenced Yegorov and Budionnyi disobedience. Joseph Stalin, in search of personal triumph, desired to capture the important industrial center of Lwów, besieged by Bolshevik forces but still resisting their assaults. Ultimately Budionny's forces, which could changed the course of the history, marched on Lwow instead of Warsaw and excluded themselves from the battle.


The Polish 5th Army counter-attacked August 14, crossing the Wkra River. It faced the combined forces of the Soviet 3rd and 15th Armies (both numerically and technically superior). The struggle at Nasielsk lasted until August 15 and resulted in almost complete destruction of the town. However, the Soviet advance toward Warsaw and Modlin was halted at the end of August 15th.

Gen. Sikorski's 5th Army progress was extremely successful, pushing exhausted Soviet units away from Warsaw and resulting in almost blitzkrieg-like operation. Sikorski's units, supported by majority of the small number of Polish tanks, armoured cars and the artillery of two armoured trains advanced at the speed of thirty kilometres a day, soon destroying any Soviet hopes for completing their "enveloping" manoeuvre in the north.

Third phase, August 16

On August 16, the Polish Reserve Army commanded by Józef Piłsudski began its march north from the Wieprz River. It faced the Mozyr Group, a Soviet corps that had defeated the Poles during the Kyiv operation several months earlier. However, during its pursuit of the retreating Polish armies, the Mozyr Group had lost most of its forces and been reduced to a mere two divisions covering a 150-kilometre front-line on the left flank of the Soviet 16th Army. On the first day of the counter-offensive, only one of the five Polish divisions reported any sort of opposition, while the remaining four, supported by a cavalry brigade, managed to push north 45 kilometres, unopposed. By evening the town of Włodawa had been liberated, and the communication and supply lines of the Soviet 16th Army had been cut. Even Piłsudzki was surprised by those early success, when the Reserve Army units covered about seventy kilometres in 36 hours splitting the Soviet offensive and meeting virtually no resistance. It turned out that Mozyr Group consisted solely of 57th Infantry Division which has been beaten in the first day of the operation. Consequently executing Piłsudzki's plan, Polish armies found a huge gap between Russian fronts and exploited, continuing their northward offensive with two armies following and wiping out the surprised and confused enemy.

On August 18 Mikhail Tukhachevski, in his headquarters in Minsk some 300 miles east from Warsaw, became fully aware of the extent of his defeat and ordered remnants of his forces to retreat and regroup. His intention was to straighten the front line, stop Polish attack and regain initiative, but the orders either arrived too late or failed to arrive at all. Soviet General Censored page's 3rd Cavalry Corps continued to advance toward Pomerania, its lines endangered by the Polish 5th Army, which had managed finally to push back the Bolshevik armies and gone over to pursuit. Polish 1st Division of the Legion, in order to cut enemies retreat, did a remarkable march from Lubartow to Bialystok - 163 miles in 6 days. Soldiers fought two battles, slept only few hours and marched for up to 21 hours a day. Their sacrifice and endurance was rewarded by cutting of the entire 16th Soviet Army at Bialystok and taking most of its troops prisoner.

The Soviet armies in the center of the front fell into chaos. Some divisions continued to fight their way toward Warsaw, while others turned to retreat, lost their cohesion and panicked. The Russian commander-in-chief lost contact with most of his forces, and all the Soviet plans were thrown into disorder by the loss of contact. Only the Russian 15th Army remained an organised force and tried to obey Tukhachevski's orders, shielding the withdrawal of the most western extended 4th Army. But defeated twice on August 19th and 20th it joined the general rout of the North-Western Front. Tukhachevski had no choice but to order a full retreat toward the Bug River. By August 21st all organized resistance cased to exist and by August 31 the Soviet South-Western Front was completely routed.

Aftermath

Although Poland managed to achieve victory and push back the Russians, Piłsudski's plan to outmanoeuvre and surround the Red Army did not succeed completely. Four Soviet armies begun march toward Warsaw on July 4th in the framework of the North-Western Front. By the end of August the 4th and 15th Armies were defeated in the field, their remnants crossed Prussian border and were disarmed. Nevertheless, these troops were soon released and fought against Poland again. The 3rd Army retreated east so quickly that Polish troops could not catch up with them, consequently, this army sustained the least loses. The 16th Army disintegrated at Bialystok and most of its soldiers become prisoners of war.

Soviet losses were about 20,000 dead and 65,000 captured (compared to Polish loses of approximately 4,500 killed, 22,000 wounded and 10,000 missing). Between 25,000 and 30,000 Soviet troops managed to reach the borders of Germany. Poland captured about 231 artillery guns and 1.023 machine-guns. After crossing into East Prussia, they were briefly interned, then allowed to leave with arms and equipment.

The southern arm of the Red Army's forces had been routed and no longer posed a threat to the Poles. Semyon Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army besieging Lwów had been defeated at the Battle of Komarów (August 31, 1920) and the Battle of Hrubieszów . By mid-October, the Polish Army had reached the Tarnopol-Dubno -Minsk-Drisa line.

Tukhachevski managed to reorganize the eastward-retreating forces and in September established a new defensive line near Grodno. In order to break it, the Polish Army had to fight the Battle of the Niemen River (September 15-September 21), once again defeating the Bolshevik armies. After the in Battle of the Szczara River both sides were exhausted by war and on October 12,under heavy pressure from France and Britain, a cease-fire was signed. By October 18 the fighting was over, and on March 18, 1921, the Treaty of Riga was signed, ending hostilities.

Orders of battle

Polish


3 Fronts (Północny, Środkowy, Południowy), 7 Armies, a total of 32 divisions: 46,000 infantry; 2,000 cavalry; 730 machine guns; 192 artillery batteries; and several units of (mostly FT-17) tanks.


Polish Army
Northern Front
Haller
Central Front
Rydz-Śmigły
Southern Front
Iwaszkiewicz
5th Army
Sikorski
4th Army
Skierski
6th Army
Jędrzejewski
1st Army
Latinik
3rd Army
Zieliński
Ukrainian Army
Censored page
2nd Army
Roja


Fronts:

Soviet

Red Army
North-Western Front
Tukhachevskiy
4th Army
Shuvayev
3rd Cavalry Corps
Censored page
15th Army
Kork
3rd Army
Lazarievich
16th Army
Sollohub
Cavalry Army
Budionnyi


See also

External links

  • Battle Of Warsaw 1920 by Witold Lawrynowicz; A detailed write-up, with bibliography http://www.hetmanusa.org/engarticle1.html

References

  • Edgar Vincent D'Abernon, The eighteenth decisive battle of the world: Warsaw, 1920, Hyperion Press, 1977, ISBN 0883554291
  • Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20, Pimlico, 2003, ISBN 0712606947
  • J.F.C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World, Hunter Publishing, ISBN 0586080368
  • Jeremy Keenan , The Pole: The Heroic Life of Josef Pilsudski, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 2004, ISBN 0715632108
  • Richard M. Watt , Bitter Glory: Poland & Its Fate 1918-1939, Hippocrene Books, 1998, ISBN 0781806739
  • Tarczynski, M. , Cud nad Wisłą, Warszawa, 1990
  • Józef Pilsudski, Pisma zbiorowe, Warszawa 1937. Reprinted in Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1991, ISBN 8303030590
  • Mikhail Tukhachevski, Lectures at Military Academy in Moscow, February 7-10, 1923. Reprinted in Pochód za Wisłę, Lodz 1989




Last updated: 04-25-2005 03:06:01