Martin Heidegger (September 26, 1889 – May 26, 1976) was a German philosopher. He studied at the University of Freiburg under Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, and became a professor there in 1928. He influenced many other major philosophers, and his own students at various times included Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt and Karl Lowith . Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe also studied his work more or less closely. Beyond his relation to phenomenology, Heidegger is regarded as a major, if not indispensable, influence on existentialism and deconstruction.

Contents

1 Early Life and Education 2 Right Conduct? Heidegger and Nazi Germany 2.1 Obligations & Unsplendid Silence: Celan at "Todtnauberg" 2.2 Conclusion 3 Philosophy 3.1 Being and Time 3.2 Later works 3.3 Influences and Difficulties of French Reception 4 Further reading 5 Quotes 6 External links

Early Life and Education

Heidegger began primarily as a Christian Aristotelian . He was born to a rural German family and raised to be Clergyman. He was influenced as teenager by Aristotle mediated through Christian theology. The concept of Being, in this traditional sense, dating back to Plato, was his first exposure to an idea he would plant at the core of his most famous work Being and Time. His family was not wealthy enough to send him to university and he required a scholarship, which itself required he study for the religious order. Mathematics was also his early major. During his time as a student he left theology for philosophy as he was able to find other academic funding. His doctorate was on Dun Scotus (John Duns the Scot), a 14th century ethical and religious thinker.

Heidegger was primarily a phenomenologist until he made a break with phenomenology, a type of philosophy that was heavy on method and lacking content. To oversimplify, Phenomenologists try to begin philosophy by clearing the mind and perceiving experience unmediated by prior knowledge or learning. Husserl was its greatest exponent. Heidegger left this theory behind and began to attempt to ground philosophy in the concept of Being. The idea of Being dates back to Plato and had a place in modern Christian philosophy and theology for centuries. Being, or the unseen permanence behind all becoming, was resurrected by Heidegger after its loss of focus in the Enlightenment. He tried to ground Being in history, or Time, and thus discovers its real essence. Needless to say this is almost contrary to logic, since Being- if it exists at all- by definition is unaffected by time, or history. Its very essence is against history, in contradistinction to the temporal.

Thus Heidegger began where Being began- in Plato, inadvertently resurrecting a lost, depreciated issue in contemporary philosophy. By doing so, he offended a large body of academics who made their living as philosophy professors, who foolishly thought the fundamental issues of science, society, art, religion and human psychology were answered. These men thought of progress, winning change or developing the world according to some rationality they felt spoke for all time, in every culture. Bertrand Russell was an example of this attitude.

Heidegger’s great opening was to take Plato seriously again, and at the same time undermine the entire Platonic world by challenging the core of Platonism- treating Being as an object of Time and History. This is partially why Platonists, such as George Grant regard Heidegger as a great thinker, even if they disagree with his analysis of Being and conception of Platonic thought. Although Heidegger deserves credit for his creativity and originality, he also borrowed heavily from Friedrich Nietzsche. It is not a false analogy to compare Heidegger to Aristotle, who took Plato’s dialogues and systematically presented them, breaking them down into treatises and concepts. Except, Nietzsche is Heidegger’s Plato. He took the poetic kernels and extracted them, sanitized them and made them respectable in the university setting. Heidegger’s published lectures during 1936 on Nietzsche’s Will to Power as Art rival any texts of Heidegger’s own thought for pure philosophical merit.

Martin Heidegger is regarded as the most important philosopher of the 20th century. His prominence is rivaled only by Wittgenstein, and his ideas have seeped into an incredibly large number of research areas. His philosophical work was taken up throughout Germany, France, and Japan and has gained, since the 1970s at least, a strong following in North America as well; it was scorned as rubbish, however, by contemporaries such as the Vienna Circle and British philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and Alfred Ayer largely because Heidegger's thought attacked and undermined some of their most cherished assumptions and conceits about philosophy.

Heidegger’s refusal to adopt current concepts such as the Fact/Value Distinction , his criticism of modern science and technology, his refusal to offer an ‘ethical’ component to his theory, claiming such a suggestion was a fundamental misunderstanding of his thought, often puzzled and confused philosophers who lacked the patience or intellectual rigor to absorb Heidegger’s reasoning. Attacking him seemed like the only thing to do, especially since his own private behavior is morally and politically ambiguous.

Right Conduct? Heidegger and Nazi Germany

Professor Heidegger's life was marred by episodes requiring serious consideration for anyone wishing to assess his character as a man; namely, his affiliation with the Nazi Party and his extra-marital affair with one of his young students- Hannah Arendt.

Heidegger (among other German scientists and intellectuals) joined the Nazi Party on May 1st 1933, before being appointed the rector of the university in Freiburg. He resigned from the rectorship in February 1934. During this time Heidegger's former teacher Husserl, who was Jewish, was denied the use of the university library at Freiburg because of the racial cleansing laws issued by the Nazi Party. Moreover, Heidegger removed the dedication to Husserl from Being and Time when it was reissued in 1941. Additionally, when his Introduction to Metaphysics (originally 1935) was reissued after the war, he declined to remove a glowing endorsement of the Nazi Party or, what is more important, comment on that endorsement.

A further complication to the story is his affair with Hannah Arendt, a Jew, when she was a doctoral student of his at the University of Marburg. It did not even end when she "fled" from him and moved to Heidelberg to continue with Karl Jaspers, and she later spoke on his behalf at his denazification hearings, and their friendship resumed, if extremely cautiously, after the war, despite or even because of the widespread contempt that Heidegger was held in for his political sympathies, and despite his being forbidden from teaching for a number of years. Additionally, the fact that Heidegger engaged in a sexual affair with Arendt while he was married, and she was his student, thus weilding considerable power over her future, casts serious doubt about his wisdom in affairs of the heart.

Some years later, hoping to quiet controversy, Heidegger gave an interview to Der Spiegel magazine, in which he promised to discuss the issue provided it was published posthumously. When the article was published, however, he did not discuss these matters forthrightly, even making a stunning comparison between the hardships encountered after the War by Germans in Communist East Germany with those suffered during the Holocaust. Incredibly, the only reference made about the Holocaust in the entire interview was a rationalization that the Holocaust could not have happened without technology. In effect, he blamed the organized, systematic destruction of millions on the increasing world power of techne, or technology, despite the interviewer's repeated attempts to get him to assess Germany’s culpability. The Der Spiegel interview was all the more chilling because many felt that because Heidegger would only allow publication after his death, that there would be a redemptive recognition of the grave crime and evil committed by the German state during the Nazi regime, an admission that his legendary stiff upper lip could never mutter while living. To further evaluate this issue, read "Only a God can save us now" Der Spiegel interview with Heidegger(1966) and Jurgen Habermas, "Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective." translated by John McCumber, Critical Inquiry 15 (Winter 1989): pp. 431-456.

Heidegger's involvements with the Nazis and the lack of a clear apology for them complicated many of his friendships, and continues to complicate the reception of his work. It is disputable whether Heidegger was antisemitic or if he was taken in by the charismatic projections of Nazi propaganda, but he had clear sympathies for certain elements of Nazism. Whether this is in any way a result of his philosophy is still contested; what is clear is that while Heidegger certainly was a Nazi, the Nazis at large were not Heideggerian in their philosophy.

Obligations & Unsplendid Silence: Celan at "Todtnauberg"

Shortly after giving the Spiegel interview and following Celan's lecture at Freiburg, Heidegger hosted Paul Celan at his chalet at Todtnauberg. The two walked in the woods. Celan impressed Heidegger with his knowledge of botany (also evident in his poetry), and Heidegger is thought to have spoken about elements of his press interview. Celan signed Heidegger's guest book.

Celan, often taken to be one of the great post-war poets writing in the German language, was born in 1920 to an Orthodox Jewish family in Romania and orphaned by the Shoah. The Shoah is the explicit subject matter of numerous Celan poems, including earlier work such as "Black Flakes" and "Death Fugue" and later ones such as "Stretto". Peter Szondi was perhaps the first critic to begin to understand that Celan's poetry was not hermetic but incorporated extensive references to Celan's own experiences. Celan's poetry ought not, however, be taken as strictly or primarily autobiographical because of this experential substrate -- Celan offered only a handful of essays on poetics, but these give us better to understand a number of things. One is that Celan's poetics are deeply informed by Heidegger's philosophy (Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe argues that poems such as "Tübingen, January" could in any case only be understood on the basis of Heidegger's remarks on Hölderlin). Another is that Celan regarded poetry to exist as a distinct field of linguistic experience, the content which cannot be exposed simply through biographical explication, even if the latter remains indispensable. It is with such caution then that one ought to read "Todtnauberg", which Celan composed very shortly after their meeting and sent to Heidegger in the first copy of a limited bibliophile edition.

In his Poetry as Experience, Lacoue-Labarthe advanced the argument that, although Celan's poetry was deeply informed by Heidegger's philosophy, Celan was long aware of Heidegger's association with the Nazi party and therefore fundamentally circumspect toward the man and transformative in his reception of his work. Celan was nonetheless willing to meet Heidegger (although he may not have been willing to be photographed with him or to contribute to Festschriften honoring Heidegger's work). Heidegger was a professed admirer of Celan's writing, although he did not attend to it as Hölderlin or Trakl. "Todtnauberg", however, seems to hold out the unrealized possibility of a profound rapprochement between their work, albeit on the condition that Heidegger break a silence that virtually blanketed his work to the end (Lacoue-Labarthe has commented on the insufficiency of Heidegger's one known remark about the gas chambers, made in 1949). In this respect Heidegger's work was perhaps redeemable for Celan, even if that redemption or what need was had for it was never transacted between the two men. Lest one implicitly take this as Celan simply demanding an apology of Heidegger (such a scenario seems simplistic, the more so given that neither was given to simplism), there are reasonable grounds to argue that it was (and still is) at least as important to specify how the Nazi period is das Unheil (disaster, calamity) (which is to say: specificity as to a great deal more than counting the dead). What compelled Heidegger to write about poetry, technology, and truth ought to have compelled him to write about the German disaster, all the more so because, on the basis of his thought, Heidegger attributed an "inner greatness" to the movement that brought about that disaster.

Lacoue-Labarthe and Jacques Derrida have both commented extensively on Heidegger's corpus and both have remarked on affinities links with his Nazi commitments that persisted until the end. It is perhaps of greater important that Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida, following Celan to a degree, believed Heidegger capable of a profound criticism of Nazism and the horrors it brought forth and hold Heidegger's greatest failure not to be his involvement in the National Socialist movement but his "silence on the extermination" (Lacoue-Labarthe) and refusal to elaborate a thorough deconstruction of Nazism beyond laying out certain of his considerable objections to party orthodoxies and (particularly in the case of Lacoue-Labarthe) their passage through Nietzsche, Hölderlin, and Richard Wagner, taken to be susceptible to Nazi appropriation. It would be reasonable to say that both Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida regarded Heidegger as capable of engaging Nazism in this other fashion and have undertaken such work on the basis of his (one ought to note in due course the questions raised by Derrida in "Desistance" in calling attention to Lacoue-Labarthe's parenthetical comment: "(in any case, Heidegger never avoids anything)").

Conclusion

The possibility that Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazi party was the result of his philosophy would lead many to discredit Heidegger as a philosopher solely on this basis (please note that such criticism would be prospective in application; as Jean-François Lyotard remarked, the formula becomes "if a Nazi, then not a great thinker" or, conversely, "if a great thinker, then not a Nazi"). It is worth noting, however, that whether or not this affiliation is distasteful or even ethically horrifying, it cannot as such be reduced to a sole criterion for judging the validity of his philosophy; to understand Heidegger's philosophical wrong one must arrive at a scholarly understanding of the extent to which the one partakes in the other (rather than attempting to "have nothing to do" with either). What is most objectionable in sharply dismissive criticisms of Heidegger's work is conflation of the two or the assertion that the two are simply but thoroughly coextensive (for example: Adorno's remark, offered in mitigation of his concessions to the National Socialist regime, that Heidegger's philosophy was "fascist down to its innermost workings," in contrast to his own failings, incidental by the contrast offered).

Having mentioned the contributions of Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Lyotard, it is worth noting that Heidegger's relation to the Shoah and Nazism was the subject of great and occasionally fractious debate across various deconstructions, whose stakes included the extent to which specific practitioners of deconstruction could entirely do without Heideggerian deconstruction (as Lyotard in particular may have wished) or were therefore obliged to further (and in the cases of many mis- and uninformed criticisms, recall) already extensive criticisms of Heidegger which considerably predated (in the case of Derrida, by decades) the broad recognition of Heidegger's activities as a National Socialist precipitated by press attention to the Farias book and extensive treatments of the Shoah and its implications (for example, the proceedings of the first conference dedicated to Derrida's work, published as Les Fins de l'Homme, the essay from which that title was taken, Derrida's Cinders and "Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing," or the studies on Celan by Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida which shortly preceded the detailed studies of Heidegger's politics published in and after 1987). On so many of these matters, please see Avital Ronell's "The Differends of Man" in Finitude's Score. Particularly given that the ways in which various deconstructions have more or less self-consciously inherited from Heidegger is often used to find them complicit in his most reprehensible politics by implication, one ought to review at least the above readings before indulging such a line of argument or when otherwise wishing to understand what filiation has been taken to mean in a philosophical context.

Philosophy

Being and Time

Heidegger's most important work is the dense and challenging Being and Time (German Sein und Zeit, 1927). Although the book as published represents only a third of the total project outlined in its introduction, it marked a turning point in continental philosophy. It has been massively influential and remains one of the most discussed works of 20th century philosophy; many subsequent philosophical views and approaches, such as existentialism and deconstruction, would have been impossible without Being and Time.

In this work, Heidegger takes up the question of the meaning of being: what does it mean to say that an entity is? This is the fundamental question of ontology, defined by Aristotle as the study of being qua being. In his approach to this question, Heidegger departs from the tradition of Aristotle and of Kant, both of whom, despite the vast difference between their respective philosophical positions, approach the question of the meaning of being from the perspective of the logic of propositional statements. Implicit in this traditional approach is the thesis that theoretical knowledge represents the most fundamental relation between the human individual and the beings in his surrounding world (including himself).

Explicitly rejecting this thesis, Heidegger instead adopts a version of the phenomenological method, purged of what he regards as the residue of Aristotelian/Kantian cognitivism still present in Husserl's formulation of this method. Like Husserl, Heidegger takes as his starting point the phenomenon of intentionality. Human behavior is intentional insofar as it is directed at some being (all building is building of something, all talking is talking about something, etc). Theoretical knowledge represents only one kind of intentional behavior, and Heidegger asserts that it is founded on more fundamental modes of behavior, modes of practical engagement with the surrounding world, rather than being their ultimate foundation. An entity is what it is (i.e., it has being) insofar as it "shows up" within a context of practical engagement (Heidegger calls such a context a 'world') not because it has certain inherent properties ascertainable by disinterested contemplation. A hammer is a hammer not because it has certain hammer-like properties, but because it is used for hammering.

This also necessitated a rejection of the Cartesian, disembodied 'I': that is, an 'I' as a purely thinking object. Instead, Heidegger insisted that any analysis of human behaviour should begin with the fact that we are in the world (not viewing it in an 'abstract' fashion): therefore the fundamental fact about human existence is our 'being-in-the-world'. Human beings, Heidegger insisted, were embodied beings who acted in the world. He therefore rejected the 'subject-object' distinction assumed by most philosophers since Descartes. Things are meaningful to us in terms of their use in certain contexts, which are defined by social norms. However, all of these norms are radically contingent. Their contingency is revealed in the fundamental phenomenon of Angst, in which all norms fall away and beings show up as nothing in particular, in their essential meaninglessness. (Contrary to some existentialist interpretations of Heidegger, this does not mean that all existence is absurd; rather, it means that existence always has the potential for absurdity.) The experience of Angst reveals the essential finitude of human being.

The fact that beings can show up, either as meaningful in a context or as meaningless in the experience of Angst, depends on a prior phenomenon: that beings can show up at all. Heidegger calls the showing up of beings 'truth,' which he defines as unconcealment rather than correctness. This truth of beings", their self-revelation, involves a more fundamental kind of truth, the "disclosure of being in which the being of beings is unconcealed." It is this unconcealment of being that defines human existence for Heidegger: the human being is that being for whom being is an issue, that is, for whom being shows up as such (Heidegger's word for such an entity, which could conceivably have non-human instantiations, is Da-sein). This is why Heidegger begins his inquiry into the meaning of being with an inquiry into the essence of human being; the ontology of Da-sein is fundamental ontology. The unconcealment of being is an essentially temporal and historical phenomenon (hence the "time" in Being and Time); what we call past, present, and future correspond originarily to aspects of this unconcealment and not to three mutually exclusive regions of the homogeneous time that clocks measure (although clock-time is derivative from the originary time of unconcealment, as Heidegger attempts to show in the book's difficult final chapters).

The total understanding of being results from an explication of the implicit knowledge of being that inheres in all human behavior. Philosophy thus becomes a form of interpretation; this is why Heidegger's technique in Being and Time is often referred to as hermeneutical phenomenology. Being and Time, being incomplete, contains Heidegger's statement of this project and his interpretation of human existence and its temporal horizon, but does not contain the working out of the meaning of being as such on the basis of this interpretation. This ambitious task is taken up in a different way in his later works (see below).

As part of his ontological project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a destructuring (Destruktion) of the philosophical tradition, an interpretive strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies. In Being and Time he briefly destructures the philosophy of Descartes; in later works he uses this approach to interpret the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Plato, among others. This technique exerted a profound influence on Derrida's deconstructive approach, although there are very important differences between the two methods.

Being and Time is the towering achievement of Heidegger's early career, but there are other important works from this period, including Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1927), Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 1929), and "Was ist Metaphysik?" ("What is Metaphysics?", 1929).

Later works

Although Heidegger claimed that all of his writings concerned a single question, the question of being, in the years after the publication of Being and Time the focus of his work gradually changed. This change is often referred to as Heidegger's Kehre (turn). In his later works, Heidegger turns from "doing" to "dwelling." He focuses less on the way in which the structures of being are revealed in everyday behavior and in the experience of Angst, and more on the way in which behavior itself depends on a prior "openness to being." The essence of being human is the maintenance of this openness. (The difference between Heidegger's early and late works is more a difference of emphasis than a radical break like that between the early and late works of Wittgenstein, but it is important enough to justify a division of the Heideggerian corpus into "early" (roughly, pre-1930) and "late" writings.)

Heidegger opposes this openness to the "will to power" of the modern human subject, who subordinates beings to his own ends rather than letting them "be what they are." Heidegger interprets the history of western philosophy as a brief period of authentic openness to being in the time of the pre-Socratics, especially Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander, followed by a long period increasingly dominated by nihilistic subjectivity, initiated by Plato and culminating in Nietzsche.

In the later writings, two recurring themes are poetry and technology. Heidegger sees poetry as a preeminent way in which beings are revealed "in their being." The play of poetic language (which is, for Heidegger, the essence of language itself) reveals the play of presence and absence that is being itself. Heidegger focuses especially on the poetry of Hölderlin.

Against the revealing power of poetry, Heidegger sets the force of technology. The essence of technology is the conversion of the whole universe of beings into an undifferentiated "standing reserve" (Bestand) of energy available for any use to which humans choose to put it. The standing reserve represents the most extreme nihilism, since the being of beings is totally subordinated to the will of the human subject. Heidegger does not unequivocally condemn technology; he believes that its increasing dominance might make it possible for humanity to return to its authentic task of the stewardship of being. Nevertheless, many of Heidegger's later works are characterized by an unmistakable agrarian nostalgia.

Heidegger's important later works include Vom Wesen der Wahrheit ("On the Essence of Truth," 1930), Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes ("The Origin of the Work of Art," 1935), Bauen Wohnen Denken ("Building Dwelling Thinking," 1951), and Die Frage nach der Technik ("The Question Concerning Technology," 1953) and Was heisst Denken? ("What is called Thinking?" 1954).

Influences and Difficulties of French Reception

Heidegger, like Husserl, was regarded as extremely influential for existentialism, despite his explicit disavowal and objection, in texts such as the "Letter on Humanism," of the importation of key elements of his work into existentialist contexts. Deconstruction as it is generally understood (i.e. as French and Anglo-American phenomena with limited exposure in a German context until the 1980s) is not known to have come to Heidegger's attention, but one feature that garnered initial interest in a French context (which propagated rather quickly to scholars of French literature and philosophy working in American universities) was the efforts of Jacques Derrida to displace the understanding of Heidegger's work prevalent in France from the period of the ban against Heidegger teaching in German universities, which amounts in part to rejecting almost wholesale the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre and existentialist terms. On Derrida's view, deconstruction is a tradition inherited via Heidegger, and Sartre's interpretation of Dasein and other key Heideggerian terms is overly psychologistic and ironically anthropocentric, consisting of a radical misconception of the limited number of Heidegger's texts commonly studied in France up to that point (namely Being and Time, What is Metaphysics?, and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics). Derrida, on the other hand, is at times presented as an ultra-orthodox "French Heidegger," so much so that he, his colleagues, and his former students are made to go proxy for Heidegger's worst mistakes, despite ample evidence that the reception of Heidegger's work by later practitioners of deconstruction is anything but doctrinaire "Heideggerianism" (the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe may be taken as exemplary in this regard and was often commended as such by Derrida).

Further reading

There is a large secondary literature on Heidegger's philosophy. Accessible commentaries on Being and Time include

• Being-in-the-World by Hubert Dreyfus and
• Heidegger and Being and Time by Stephen Mulhall.

By far the best and most even-handed biography of Heidegger, which also is perhaps the best introduction to his thought, is

• Rüdiger Safranski 's Heidegger. Between Good and Evil

which is the English translation of his Ein Meister aus Deutschland (the title is an allusion to Paul Celan's "Todesfugue").

More information on the subject of Heidegger's political history can be found in

• Victor Farias 's 1987 book, Heidegger and Nazism .

It should be noted that in many philosophical circles, Farias' arguments are controversial, and many of his conclusions are contested.

There is a danger in taking Heidegger's Nazi enthusiasm, membership, support and subsequent silence on the Holocaust too plainly. More specifically, the facts of 'Heidegger the Nazi’ may obscure the relation his thinking has on a deeper theoretical level to fascism and extreme political movements.

Another relatively accessible account that attempts to work with the philosophical meaning of Heidegger's political involvement is

• Dominique Janicaud 's The Shadow of That Thought.

• Hans Sluga 's book Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy & Politics in Nazi Germany

gives a fair examination of the relations between philosophy and politics. Similar questions have been taken up from a philosophical perspective by (among others)

• Derrida in Of Spirit,
• Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in Typography and
• Heidegger, Art, and Politics, and to a lesser extent, but still significant in offering key insights,
• Poetry as Experience,
• Bourdieu in The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, and
• Lyotard in Heidegger and "the Jews".

Quotes

We each die our own death; no one can die for us.

Nothing nots (Das Nichts nichtet).

Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The they, which supplies the answer to the who of everyday Da-sein, is the nobody to whom every Da-sein has always already surrendered itself, in its being-among-one-another. (from Being and Time, Stambaugh translation)

The domination of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already decided upon even the possibilities of being attuned, that is, about the basic way in which Da-sein lets itself be affected by the world. The they prescribes that attunement, it determines what and how one "sees." (from Being and Time, Stambaugh translation)

Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology. (from The Question Concerning Technology)

External links

• A commentary on Being and Time http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/eands/heid.html
• A web page with many Heidegger links http://www.webcom.com/paf/ereignis.html
• A web page discussing Heidegger's connection to Nazism http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/apr2000/heid-a03.shtml
• A Heidegger discussion and work forum http://www.mitdasein.com/6/ubb.x
• Heidegger and "Zuhandenheit" by Ralph Lichtensteiger http://www.lichtensteiger.de/heidegger.html
• The Ister: Film inspired by a lecture course delivered by Martin Heidegger on Fredrich Hölderlin in Germany in 1942 http://www.theister.com/