Electronic Voting in Begium started in 1991 where two locations were choosen to experiment on different electronic voting systems. The law to permit this experiment was passed by an absolute majorty with no opposition at all. One of the system tested was based on a touch pannel similar to those used in the Netherlands. The other system, still in use in 2004, is based on magnetic card and a voting machine with a light pen.

In 1994 the electronic voting experiment was extended to arround 22% of the Belgian population. Every kind of voting area: big cities, small village, French speakin, Dutch speaking or legally speaking both language area were tested.

In 1999 the system was extended to 44% of the population, however, due to lobbying from group like PourEva[1] and increasing doubt in the system, new test and more control were added. The most important test is the introduction of optical reading of paper ballot in two areas, the test was schedule for 3 election up to 2003 and was not reconducted. That test was successful and gave no problems despite being the first election to use it. Optical reading kind of eVoting is VVAT and guarantees the possibility of a human recount. The extra control introduced is the creation of an expert committee to monitor the electronic election process. That committee discoverd the high dependancy of the ministry of interior toward the vendor of the eVoting system.

In 2000 the local election in Audergem (part of Brussels) were contested in all available Belgian courts and the issue of legality of eVoting was raised to the European Court of Human Rights. The European court discarded that request without analysing the content.

In 2003 a new eVoting system was introduce in order to try to convince the citizen that the system was safe. In the tow locations that originally staterd eVoting, a "Ticketing" system was introduce. The principle is to add a printer next to the voting machine (magnetic carc and light pen) and a paper copy of the vote is printed and approuved by the elector. Once the election are finish, all the paper vote (ticket) are counted and compared to the electronic result. In case of discrepancy, the paper version rule. Nowhere the paper count and the electronic count matched and it was decided (against the law) to favor the electronic result, considered as more reliable. The law to organise that new test stated explicitly that this was for only one election only.

In 2004, for the European Elections, all the tests were ended and all the 44% of the population already voting electronically did it with the magnetic card. No more Ticketing or Optical Reading. It is to be noticed that since 1999 no more new location were migrated from paper to eVoting. Also, the equipment acquired in 1994 were not supposed to be used in 2004, however the government chose to use them one more year.

[1] PourEva Pour une Ethique du Vote Automatisé http://www.poureva.be/